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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE
REAL PROPERTY LAWYER
ROBERT KRATOVIL*
HE CODE, particularly Article 9, which deals with chattel se-
curity, abolishes much pre-Code terminology and many pre-
Code distinctions. Any lien upon chattels, including chattels
intended to be affixed to land as fixtures, is now created by means of a
document called a security agreement. Instead of recording the se-
curity agreement, however, the Code provides for filing a notice of
the existence of the security agreement. This is something of a novelty
to the real property lawyer. In real property law nothing but the re-
cording of the original instrument will satisfy our familiar recording
law and serve to impart constructive notice.' Under the Code, how-
ever, it is not the original instrument that is recorded but rather a
brief notice called a financing statement which gives notice of the
existence of the security agreement. This should be a welcome innova-
tion, for it means that all the "fine print" provisions can be eliminated
from the public records. This method of filing is called notice filing.
This brings us to the place of filing and manner of indexing of this
financing statement. The Code sets up a rather complex system of
filing and indexing. If a financing statement affects a fixture, or an
article that is to become a fixture, the law specifies that the financing
statement must be filed in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be filed,2 but instead of being indexed in the grantor-
grantee index or other real estate indexes, it is to be indexed in a
separate Code index.3 It seems that the Code, as drafted, calls for a
* Mr. Kratovil is the Vice-President of the Chicago Title and Trust Company. He
received his LL.B. degree from DePaul University and is a member of the Illinois Bar.
He was a Professor of Law at DePaul University where he taught courses in Property
Law and Mortgages. He is a member of the American, Illinois and Chicago Bar Asso-
ciations.
1Herzer v. Dembosz, 19 Ill. 2d 446, 167 N.E.2d 210 (1961).
2U.C.C. § 9-401.
3 To be sure, a number of states have deviated from the official Code. The official text
of the Code with amendments may be found in 1 CCH 1966 INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE
(hereafter referred to as CCH). State deviations from the official Code accompany the
text under the heading "Local Modifications."
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system of filings distinct from filings theretofore existing under the
recording laws, for it requires that all Code documents be marked
with a consecutive file number,4 and this could not be done if they
were numbered in the same series of numbers that are traditionally
stamped by the recorder on ordinary deeds and mortgages. This means
that there is a new set of filings that impart constructive notice to
those dealing in land. Any purchaser or mortgagee of land must there-
fore make a search of the index of documents filed under the Code, and
if this search reveals the filing of a financing statement affecting an
article that is or is to become a fixture, any purchaser or mortgagee
of the land will take subject to the right of the creditor holding the
fixture lien to remove the article if the debt is not paid. This concept
is treated more fully later in this article.
Surprisingly, the statutory form financing statement does not re-
quire the financing statement to state the amount of the debt. No
doubt this information is to be obtained from the secured party. A
lien filing that does not state the amount of the debt is, again, some-
thing of a novelty to the real property lawyer, for under some decisions,
a real estate mortgage that does not give the amount of the debt does
not impart constructive notice.'
Section 9-402 sets forth a number of requirements that must be
complied with when one seeks to file a financing statement. Naturally,
questions will arise with respect to financing statements that do not
comply with this section in one or more particulars. It has been held
that where a financing statement was offered for filing, but it did not
contain the mailing address of the debtors, as required by the Code,
it was not entitled to be filed.' Hence, if filed, it would not impart
constructive notice. In another case,7 a financing statement was held
invalid because it lacked the address of the secured party.
Another loose-leaf service, P-H CONSUMER & COMMERCIAL CREDIT INSTALLMENT SALES
(hereafter referred to as P-H) provides a state-by-state survey of sales laws. State
law divergences from the official text of the Code may be found under the section
devoted to the appropriate state. One of the common deviations calls for filing in the
grantor-grantee indexes any financing statement relating to a fixture. Deviations of
this sort from the "uniform" Code provisions have led to the present re-study of Article 9,
which will ultimately produce an improved version of Article 9.
4 U.C.C. § 9-403.
5 Bullock v. Battenhousen, 108 Ill. 28 (1883) ; OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES 264 (1951).
6 In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (ED. Pa. 1962).
7 Strevell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May, 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366 (1967).
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Where a photocopy of a signed financing statement was filed, it
was held that this was an ineffective filing and did not impart con-
structive notice.8 This point is of importance because often the person
filing a financing statement is in doubt as to whether or not the article
in question is a fixture or a chattel. He may therefore wish to file the
document both in the recorder's office and in the office or offices where
chattel filings are made. This case appears to indicate that the document
must be executed in duplicate or triplicate so that a signed original
can be filed in each office.
Whether this idea, that the financing statement must bear an origi-
nal signature in order to impart constructive notice, will generally
be accepted is a difficult question to answer. Nothing in the Code
requires a manual signature on a financing statement so long as the
signer has accepted or adopted a printed signature or some other type
of signature in question as his own. It is a matter of determining the
intention of the signer. This problem of signature is no novelty. The
Statute of Frauds demands that the memorandum required by the
statute be signed, but the statute does not tell us how the signature
must be affixed. The courts leave this up to the party signing the
document. A printed signature has been held to be sufficient if there
is an intention to adopt it as a signature. 9 Suppose, for example, that
a subdivider subdivides a tract into 500 lots. He can print up a con-
tract of sale with his signature on it, fill in the lot number and the
purchaser's name and hand the purchaser this printed contract for
his signature. This printed contract with the printed signature is en-
forceable because there is a clear intention on the part of the seller
to adopt the printed signature as a signature. 10 This is plainly the
rule under the Code. Section 1-201(39) provides that the word
"signed" includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing. The Official Text with
Comments, under section 1-201(39), offers this comment:
The inclusion of authentication in the definition of "signer" is to make clear that
as the term is used in this act a complete signature is not necessary. Authentication
may be printed, stamped or written: it may be by initials or by thumbprint. It may
be on any part of the document and in appropriate cases may be found in a bill-
head or letterhead. No catalog of possible authentications can be complete and the
court must use common sense and commercial experience in passing upon these
sIn re Kane, 55 Berks County L.J. 1 (1962).
937 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of 697 (1943).
10 Id.
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matters. The question always is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by
the party with present intention to authenticate the writing. (Emphasis supplied)
One feels misgivings, however, about a photographed document. If
A signs a document and hands it to B, and B chooses to photograph
it so that he can file it in two places, it can, with considerable force and
logic, be argued that A signed only one document and had no intention
of signing the other or of adopting the photograph as his signature.
As to the signature of the secured party on the financing statement,
the courts are already rewriting the Code. In Strevell-Paterson Finance
Co. v. May," the court held the signature of the secured party not
necessary (though section 9-402 expressly requires it), and in Bene-
dict v. Lebowitz, 12 the court stated that it suffices if the name of the
secured party is typed in the body of the instrument.
The mere presence on the public records of a perfected fixture financ-
ing statement does not establish the existence of a valid fixture se-
curity transaction. A filed financing statement not supported by an
existing security agreement and lacking the essentials of a security
agreement is void."i It is the security agreement that creates a se-
curity interest in the lender. Under the "notice filing" concept of the
Code, a financing statement is only a notice of the existence of a se-
curity agreement. A security agreement, moreover, exists only "when
value is given.""
Another problem under the Code relates to the matter of descrip-
tions. Section 9-110 provides that any description of personal property
or real estate is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably
identifies what is described. Obviously, this section was intended to
grant considerable latitude. It was intended to overrule some earlier
cases holding that a chattel mortgage was not good as to third parties
unless it gave a specific description of the chattels (for example, giving
the serial numbers on the motors or appliances, if they bore a serial
number). Under the Code we find financing statements which simply
describe the property as "heavy duty knife grinders." This is per-
plexing. It is difficult to tell whether this is something that one can
hold in one's hand or whether it is two stories high and is securely
bolted to the floor of a plant. Undoubtedly one difficulty under the
11Supra note 7.
12 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965).
13 American Card Co. v. H. M. H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (196j).
14U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
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Code, with respect to description of the property subject to the lien,
stems from the fact that section 9-402 states that the financing state-
ment is sufficient if it indicates the types or describes the items of
collateral. The reason the law was phrased in this manner is evident
when one considers that one purpose of the Code was to permit a
financing statement to cover an indeterminate number of transactions
involving the same types of collateral, covered, perhaps, by a series
of security agreements. 5
The Code provides that if the document affects articles which are
affixed or are to be affixed to real estate, the document must contain
a description of the real estate. The description required is one that
reasonably identifies the real estate.'6 Probably a street address de-
scription would be sufficient, if it contains the city and state where
the real estate is located.' 7 To the extent that this rule appears to
incorporate the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, it may incor-
porate the existing conflict of authority as to what constitutes a reason-
ably adequate description of land under the Statute of Frauds. 8
As can be seen, a recurring problem arising under the Code stems
from the fact that it is often difficult to determine whether articles
are chattels or fixtures. This can be met by double or triple filing, one
duplicate being filed as a fixture filing, the others being filed with the
chattel filings.
With respect to the form of fixture filings, section 9-402(3) is ap-
plicable. It sets out a form for a financing statement with a separate
paragraph set aside for the real estate description where the filing
covers fixtures. A problem that the draftsmen of the Code did not
foresee was that in adopting officially approved Code forms, many
of the Secretaries of State throughout the country have ignored this
section. The official printed Code financing statement in many states
omits the Code paragraphing and leaves the fixture information to be
inserted in a general box pursuant to instructions printed at the top
of the form. These instructions are often ignored.' 9
15 Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent
Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IOWA L. REv. 289, 328 (1962).
10U.C.C. § 9-110. This resembles the requirement of the Statute of Frauds. Supra
note 9, at 670.
17 Heroux v. Romanowski, 336 III. 297, 168 N.E. 305 (1930).
18 K.ATOVm, Rm ESTATE LAW 114 (4th ed. 1964).
19 Financing Statements for Fixture Filing, 23 Bus. LAW. 121 (1968).
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Another problem presented by these sections is that they do not
require the indexing of financing statements in the grantor-grantee
index or in tract books in the states where these are official indexes.
There is only the index of Code filings.2" This problem is aggravated
by the fact that in most states the Code does not require consumer
goods filings to be segregated from fixture filings. The result is chaos
in the big metropolitan areas, where each day's filings are a jumble
of chattel and fixture filings on identical forms filled out in general
language that could apply to either chattels or fixtures.
Some question has been raised as to whether a mortgagee of real
estate must also insist upon receiving a security agreement and re-
cording a financing statement in the recorder's office in order to
acquire a good lien upon fixtures existing at the date of the mortgage.
There is no doubt upon this score. A mortgage in the old-fashioned
form recorded in the old-fashioned way in the recorder's office, in the
land records, creates a good and valid lien upon the real estate, in-
cluding the fixtures. This is the clear meaning of section 9-313, which
provides:
The law of this state other than this act determines whether and when such
goods become fixtures. This act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon
fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
Three distinct situations that present true fixture problems involv-
ing a real estate mortgage are:
(1) The fixture is installed before a mortgage is given. Here the
problem is one of constructive notice.
Example: A installs a new furnace in his home in 1967 and a financing statement
is filed in the Code fixture filings listing A as debtor. In 1968, A mortgages his home
to B. B has constructive notice of the financing statement and takes subject to it.
Of course, if no Code fixture filing has been made, the mortgagee is protected and
20 The official Code simply says that a fixture filing shall be made in the "office" where
a mortgage on real estate would be fied. U.C.C. § 9-401(1) (b). In a large metropolitan
area such an office will have different windows or cages where different types of docu-
ments are presented. In Cook County, Illinois, and one presumes elsewhere, a separate
window is provided for Code filings and Code document numbers are assigned in
sequence with the prefix "UCC." As to indexing, there is no Code requirement that
fixture filings be indexed in the real property records. Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 44, 53 (1964). However, in a number of states
the Code has been adopted with amendments that require indexing of fixture filings in
the land records. See CCH and P-H (supra note 3).
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no problem is presented. 2' Even the ten-day grace period for filing given under
section 9-312(4) seems inapplicable to real estate interests.22
(2) The fixture is installed after the real estate has been mortgaged,
but a construction loan is not involved.
Example: In 1967, A mortgages his home to B. In 1968, A replaces his old
furnace with a new one purchased on credit. The credit seller has the right of
removal. Under the old law the question was one of material injury. We will re-
turn to this thought later.
(3) A fixture is purchased on credit and installed while a construction
loan is in the process of disbursement.
Example: A mortgages his vacant land to B, a construction lender, who disburses
the loan proceeds as the building goes up. A buys on credit a furnace which is in-
stalled during the progress of construction. After all the construction money has
been disbursed, the credit seller of the furnace seeks to remove it. B objects. A is in-
solvent.
Each of these situations offers its own peculiar problems.
Let us go back to situation (1), the constructive notice problem,
and analyze the complications that may arise.
Suppose the collateral consists of one hundred hot water tanks
purchased by a professional builder on credit and warehoused. He
has no idea at the time where these tanks will utilmately be installed.
That being the case, the creditor can only file the financing statement
with the chattel filings, usually with the Secretary of State and ad-
ditionally, in some states, where the debtor resides or has a place of
business. What happens after the hot water tanks have been installed
in various buildings throughout the state? Must any purchaser or
mortgagee search the records of the Secretary of State to see whether
or not financing statements were filed covering such hot water tanks?
It is obvious that one of two innocent parties must suffer here. Where
the building containing the hot water tanks is sold to an innocent pur-
chaser, if he gets title free and clear of the financing statement, the
creditor is hurt. If, on the other hand, the financing statement is good
against the purchaser of the real estate, the purchaser is hurt. The
correct view is that the purchaser of the real estate is protected. The
reasons cannot be stated briefly.
One begins with the case law as it existed prior to 1904. At that
time in most states provision was made for filing conditional sale
21U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(D), 9-313(4).
22 Kripke, supra note 20, at 73.
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contracts and chattel mortgages in a portion of the recorder's office
usually called the "personal property records" or "chattel mortgage
records." These records served their purpose admirably when one was
dealing with ordinary chattels. A man who was about to buy a carriage
could look at the records to see if there were any prior chattel liens
on it.
Suppose, however, he was about to buy a house. Was it necessary
for him to search the chattel records for liens on the furnace? The
hot water heater? The oil burner? The sink? The tub? And so on. To
ask the question is to answer it. The majority of our courts answered
in the negative. If one buys chattels, he searches only the chattel
records; if he buys land, he searches only the land records.3 This
was simple and logical, but it was a poor answer for the man selling
on credit an article, like a furnace, that was certain to be affixed to
land. He had no satisfactory way of protecting himself.
To resolve this predicament, the ancestor of the Code provisions
relating to fixture filings was enacted in 1904 in New York. In that
year New York passed a law providing that conditional sales of ar-
ticles, that were attached to or were to be attached to buildings, must
contain a brief description of the real estate and must be filed in the
land records. Here is the first rational recognition of the fact that
many articles sold as chattels are sold on credit, that they will become
fixtures by installation in buildings, and that credit sellers of these
articles are deserving of protection. Unlike the usual chattel security
documents, these documents were required to contain an adequate
description of the land; and they found their way into the traditional
real estate indexes, the grantor-grantee indexes, since the document
was left with the same recorder who took in deeds. Legislation similar
in character was later enacted in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Oregon.24
23 Elliott v. Hudson, 18 Cal. App. 642, 124 P. 103 (1912); Trull v. Fuller, 28 Me. 545
(1848); Tibbets v. Horne, 65 N.H. 242, 23 A. 145 (1891); Merchants & Mech. Fed. S. &
L. Assn. v. Herald, 201 N.E.2d 237 (Ohio App. 1964); XXth Century Heating & Ventilat-
ing Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App. 188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937); Peoria
Stone & Marble Works v. Sinclair, 146 Iowa 56, 124 N.W. 772 (1910) ; Williams v. Hyde,
98 Mich. 152, 57 N.W. 98 (1893); Kelvinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schader, 225 Mo. App.
479, 39 S.W.2d 385 (1931); Phillips v. Newsome, 179 S.W. 1123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915);
Smith v. Waggoner, 50 Wis. 155, 6 N.W. 568 (1880); 1 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES,
§ 134 (5th ed. 1894); 1 PATTON, TITLES 147 (2d ed. 1957); 1 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY,
§ 218 (1924); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.14 (1952).
24 Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgages, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 180, 195 (1948).
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The Uniform Conditional Sales Act was later promulgated. This
law, modeled after the New York law of 1904, provided in Section 7,
in part, as follows:
If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional sale or subse-
quently as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury to
the freehold, the reservation of property shall be void after the goods are so affixed
as against subsequent purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of the
conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale contract, or a copy thereof, to-
gether with a statement signed by the seller briefly describing the realty and stating
that the goods are or are to be affixed thereto, shall be filed before such purchase
in the office where a deed of the realty would be recorded or registered to affect
such realty.25
In giving the reason for the inclusion of this provision, George Bo-
gert, then Dean of the Cornell University College of Law, observed:
The conditional seller of the fixture should not get protection by filing the con-
tract with ordinary conditional sale contracts and making a record similar to that
made in the case of chattel mortgages. It is unreasonable to ask purchasers and
mortgagees of realty to search in the personal property records regarding every
article connected with a building which might have been sold separately.26
It is important to assimilate the full import of this philosophy. While
credit sellers of articles that will become fixtures are to be afforded
an opportunity to protect themselves, it was considered unreasonable
to ask purchasers or mortgagees of land to search the personal prop-
erty records. This is the philosophy deeply embedded in the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act. The decisions under that act fully support this
view.
It is now time to turn to the Code itself. In the Uniform Commer-
cial Code we find the requirement that security interest documents
relating to articles that "are or are to become fixtures" must be filed
"in the office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would
be filed or recorded.
' 27
The Official Text makes this comment:
Fortunately there is general agreement that the proper filing place for security
interests in fixtures is in the office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned
25 2 UNIFORM LAW ANN. 12 (1922).
26 2A UNiyORM LAWS ANN. 98 (1924). The decisions under the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act also took this view. In re Brownsville Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 463 (1941);
Schwartz v. Collett, 24 Wash. 2d 653, 166 P.2d 940 (1946) ; General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Capital Associates, 108 N.J. Law 421, 158 A. 107; affm'd 110 N.J. Law
61, 164 A. 20 (1923); Kohler Co., Inc. v. Brasun, 249 N.Y. 224, 164 N.E. 31 (1928).
27 U.C.C. § 9-401.
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would be filed or recorded, and . . . subsection (1)(b) . . . so provide[s]. This
provision follows the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Note that there is no re-
quirement for an additional filing with the chattel records.
28
The comment to section 9-313 relates:
Under this article, as under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act the place of
filing with respect to goods affixed or to be affixed to realty is with the real estate
records and not with the chattel records.2 9
This means that under the Code, as under the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act and the common law, purchasers and mortgagees of real
estate need not concern themselves with those records that relate
only to personal property, such as those that are filed under the Code
with the Secretary of State. In other words, if there is no filing in
the local recorder's indexes, there is no constructive notice. People
dealing with land need not search the office where only chattel liens
are filed.30
To sum up, under the case law that preceded the Code, an over-
whelming majority of the courts held that purchasers or mortgagors
of land need not search the chattel records. Under the state legislation
enacted later in New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Oregon,
the same rule was laid down. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act the same rule was also laid down. With respect to the Code, the
official text with comments indicates that it was the desire of the
draftsmen to adopt the philosophy of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act. There is not the slightest suggestion anywhere in the Code of
the intention to make a change so revolutionary as to charge pur-
chasers of land with notice of chattel filings in the Secretary of
State's Office. In these circumstances, courts are not likely to hold
that such chattel filings impart constructive notice to purchasers of
28 OFFIcIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS U.C.C. § 9-401.
2 9 OmciAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS U.C.C. § 9-313.
30 The reliance placed on the Official Text with Comments is not misplaced. To be
sure, as the entitlement of the volume suggests, the text is not the Official Text with
Official Comments. Nevertheless the comments carry great weight, and what the comments
omit is quite as important as what they include. Skilton, Some Comments on the Com-
ments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wisc. L. REv. 597. If a revolutionary
departure from pre-Code law were intended, it is reasonable to suppose the comments
would signal this development. Instead they give every evidence of a disposition to accord
with pre-Code law on this score. See U.C.C. § 1-103.
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land."' Statutes must always be interpreted to avoid absurd conse-
quences, 2 and this would indeed be an absurd consequence.
Another problem of constructive notice exists under the Code where
the filing of the financing statement is in the name of a debtor who
has no interest in the real estate.
Section 9-403 of the Code provides:
The filing officer shall index the statements according to the name of the debtor
and shall note in the index the file number and the address of the debtor given in
the statement.
Presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of the filing fee or
acceptance of the statement by the filing officer constitutes filing under this article.
(Emphasis supplied)
Where the landowner installs the article, and the financing state-
ment lists his name as debtor, a name search of the Code index of
fixture filings will reveal the financing statement. But where a building
contractor, having no interest in the land, buys an article, such as a
water heater, which he installs in the building, and the financing state-
ment lists his name as debtor, a real problem presents itself, because
a person searching the land records would have no information
leading him to the name of the building contractor.
Let us consider the language of our old recording laws relating to
deeds. They provide, in most states, for an official grantor-grantee
index. They do not provide, in so many words, that a "wild" deed or
mortgage does not impart constructive notice. The cases say so, but the
statute does not. The recording law simply says that deeds, mortgages
and other real estate documents shall be indexed according to the
names of the parties. The courts took it from there, and evolved the
notion that an orderly, chronological sequence of instruments was re-
quired with names therein sufficiently similar that they were deemed
idem sonans.33 This is the familiar chain of title theory. Under it a
"wild deed," where the grantor is a stranger to the chain of title,84 does
not impart notice. Is there any reason to suppose that the court will
not arrive at the same conclusion with respect to the provisions of the
31 Coogan, supra note 15, at 328.
8 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 326, at 627 (1953).
3 3 Harris v. Reed, 21 Idaho 463, 121 P. 780 (1912).
34 PArTON, TITLEs § 69 (2d ed. 1937).
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Code? What possible reason would exist for requiring indexing in the
name of the debtor, unless this had some significant relation to the
land in question? In holding that purchasers of land need not search
the personal property records and that "wild" deeds do not impart
constructive notice, the courts, without benefit of any legislative crutch,
took a practical, sensible approach to the problem.
With respect to chattel mortgages, it was well established that the
chain of title theory was applicable. Thus in New England National
Bank v. Northwestern National Bank, the court said:
The weight of authority is that a mortgage on personal property made by one
who is not the owner of the property, or by the owner in a fictitious name, and
placed on record, is not constructive notice to any one dealing with the owner
in his true name. The reason of the rule is that such conveyances in fictitious
names or in the name of an agent lie outside the chain of title, and therefore
impart no notice. This is the rule always as to real property. . . .And so far as
mortgages are concerned, the same rule must obtain as to chattels, if any efficacy
is to be given to our registry acts. This is the doctrine that prevails elsewhere....
If conveyances from one stranger to another would be notice to all the world,
miserable would be the situation of the purchaser.35
The same was true of conditional sale contracts.30
Thus although the statutes say a deed gives notice from the date it is
filed, the courts say this is not so when the deed is a "wild" deed. The
chattel mortgage statutes were construed the same way, and the con-
ditional sales acts were construed the same way. Nothing in the Official
Text with Comments indicates a disposition to depart from this inveter-
ate and unbending interpretation of the law. Will the courts, therefore,
take the literal language of the Code, so similar to that of our other
recording laws, and from this contrive a truly revolutionary innovation
in the law? This certainly seems unlikely.
In a decision of potential importance in this area, it was held that
a Uniform Commercial Code filing under the name "Kaplas" did not
impart constructive notice as against a later financing statement to
another party made under the correct name "Kaplan." ' This is good
"chain of title" theory. The "chain of title" theory has not, as yet,
appeared by that name in the reports with respect to the Code. In-
35 171 Mo. 307, 71 S.W. 191 (1902).
S6 Industrial Bank of Commerce v. Packard Yonkers Corp., 279 App. Div. 125, 108
N.Y.S.2d 249, aff'd 304 N.Y. 622, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1952).
37 Bank of America v. Bank of Nutley, 94 N.J. Super. 220, 227 A.2d 535 (1967).
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evitably, of course, it will. When and if it is established that the "chain
of title" theory applies to the Code, the problem of the building contrac-
tor will disappear because his name does not appear in the chain of
title.
In connection with this problem, a check of the loose-leaf services
indicates that nearly half the states have departed from the Code by
requiring the financing statement to contain the name of the record
owner. Many of these states go on to require that the financing state-
ment be thereupon indexed in the Code fixture filings in the name of
the record owner and a lesser number require indexing in the grantor-
grantee land records.8
We turn now to the second situation, the "material injury" problem.
Where a security interest in a fixture attached prior to the time the
fixture is installed as such, and the fixture is installed on mortgaged
land, the situation is governed by section 9-313 of the Code. It provides
that the secured party has the right to remove the fixture from the real
estate if a default occurs in the payments due under the security agree-
ment, although he must reimburse the real estate mortgagee for the cost
of repairing any physical injury to the building occasioned by such re-
moval. He need not pay for diminution in value of the real estate caused
by the absence of the goods or the necessity for replacing them. Under
the law prior to the Code, removal would not have been permitted in
such circumstance if it would entail material injury to the freehold.39
The reason why the existing rule was changed is not difficult to discern.
The question of what constituted material injury to the freehold was
one that presented great difficulty under the old case law and under
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Even with respect to uncom-
plicated articles, like furnaces installed in single-family dwellings lo-
cated on mortgaged land, the decisions were in conflict. A majority of
the courts permitted removal of furnaces on the theory that removal
would entail no material injury to the "freehold," meaning no material
injury to the building. Other cases followed the institutional doctrine
and prohibited removal on the theory that removal of a furnace makes
a house untenantable in winter.4" All these problems are swept aside by
the provisions of the Code permitting removal in all such cases, but
3 8 Supra note 3.
89 Kratovil, supra note 24, at 200.
40 Kratovil, supra note 24, at 214, et seq.
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requiring compensation to be made for the cost of repair of physical
injury to the building.
Section 9-313 is modeled after a 1935 amendment to the Pennsyl-
vania Conditional Sales Act. Prior to the enactment of this law, the
Pennsylvania Act simply stated that where articles were sold under
a conditional sales contract they could be removed by a conditional
vendor if the removal would not constitute material injury to the free-
hold. As construed in Pennsylvania prior to 1935, material injury was
present if removal of the articles would interrupt the functioning of
the industrial plant or other establishment in which the articles were
installed." It was the purpose of the 1935 amendment to nullify this
doctrine. 2
This is the problem: Where one wrongfully causes an impairment of
the security of a mortgage, this is a tort and such party is answerable
to the mortgagee in damages. The Code allows removal in language that
appears to make the removal perfectly valid, not tortious. Its language
authorizes the chattel lienor to remove his collateral from the real es-
tate, but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real es-
tate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the
cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for "any diminution in
value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or
by any necessity for replacing them." Suppose, then, that A mortgages
to B an office building which is fully rented out to tenants. Thereafter
A purchases from C under a chattel security arrangement automatic
elevators which are installed. On default in the chattel security docu-
ment C removes the elevators. All the tenants move out. All the
"going concern" value, on which B relied in making his loan, has been
destroyed. Is this a "diminution in value of the real estate" for which
liability is excused under the Code? If the real estate mortgagee has
no recourse for a destruction of the mortgage security, certainly the
law seems unfair. And yet, it was precisely this unfairness that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out in 1934, and that the 1935
amendment to the Pennsylvania statute was intended to legalize. Since,
as Professor Gilmore suggests, the Code draftsmen were aiming at an
41 Central Lithograph v. Eatmore Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 175 A. 697 (1934).
42 Robinson, McGrough, & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. Pirr. L. REv. 89, 94 (1955);
OSBORNa, MORTGAGES 594 (1951).
[Vol. XVIII: 101
THE UCC AND THE REAL PROPERTY LAWYER
across-the-board rejection of the old Pennsylvania-New Jersey think-
ing, the Code means exactly what it says. 3
One commentator on the Code senses the problem, sees the injustice,
and suggests that the right of self-help should not exist in these situa-
tions, but that judicial foreclosure of the fixture lien should be manda-
tory so that equity could protect the landowner and mortgagee:
Another example would be the attempted removal of an elevator from a sky-
scraper. Such removal would shockingly diminish the economic value of the re-
maining building for those having interests therein. . . . [T]herefore, the fixture
secured party should be denied his right to remove; instead, he should be re-
quired to use judicial foreclosure proceedings. This will bring into play the full
equitable powers of the court for the purpose of preserving the value of the real
estate as an integrated economic unit and maximizing the recovery for all parties
having an interest in the real estate. Limiting the right to remove in no way de-
tracts from the fixture secured party's paramount security interest in his col-
lateral. It merely requires him to enforce his security interest in a sensible and
equitable fashion. 44
This is not unlike a point of view expressed much earlier:
Mortgage loans on vacant buildings are rare. Where a mortgage loan is made to
a businessman, it is the going concern with its going concern value on which the
mortgage banker relies. Even a distressed property has going concern value, and
indeed the compelling motive of an equity receivership is the preservation of this
going concern value. When a credit vendor exercises his right of removal, leaving
the walls of the building intact but disrupting operations, has he not occasioned
a diminution of the going concern value of the security? 45
If an attorney is rendering an opinion to a mortgagee at some date
after the recording of the mortgage, and he encounters a fixture filing
subsequent to such recording, he must raise this as an objection prior
and superior to the mortgage, for the Code makes it so. Whether
or not one agrees with the philosophy of the Code in this respect, the
intention it expresses is unmistakably clear.
Another problem a mortgagee encounters with respect to additional
optional advances he might wish to make after the initial disburse-
43 2 GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 804 (1966).
44 Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral, 73 YALE
L.J. 788, 805 (1964). Other illustrations occur. Removal of heating or air-conditioning
units could cause a tenant exodus. Sprinkler systems have been removed. Bank of Republic
v. Wells-Jackson Corp., 358 Ill. 356, 193 N.E. 215 (1934). This could result in loss of fire
insurance coverage. Perhaps the answer here is that examples of this sort have not
appeared with great frequency in the reported decisions, suggesting the possibility that
they are relatively rare.
45 Kratovil, supra note 24, at 217.
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ment, is that fixture liens after the mortgage has been recorded, ap-
parently need not be filed in order to be valid as against a prior
mortgage.46 This is because under section 9-313 a security interest
which attaches to goods before they become fixtures has priority over
the claims of persons who "have" an interest in the real estate. Thus
Thomas Pfeiler of the United States Savings and Loan League suggests:
A mortgagee probably would be much more willing to extend leniency to a de-
linquent borrower if he were sure that his first mortgage is the only lien on the
entire property; under these circumstances, he might even be induced to make an
additional advance in order to help the borrower out of a temporary financial
difficulty. However, under subsection (2) of Section 9-313, while a desperate
borrower in bad financial straits might insist that the real estate is free of fixture
liens, the real estate mortgagee (even by a search) would have no way of know-
ing whether or not a secret (and prior) lien upon that part of the real estate
which is represented by a subsequently installed fixture actually is in existence by
virtue of said section. The uncertainties created by virtue of the automatic (and
secret) priority given to fixture-secured lenders, subsection (2) of Section 9-313
might well cause institutional mortgage lenders to take an across-the-board, hard-
hearted approach regarding all loan delinquency cases in order to avoid all further
detriment to their mortgage interest by virtue of the priority provision of Sec-
tion 9-313(2).47
By similar reasoning, the Code does not protect a landowner paying
his general contractor against unfiled security interests. 8
The third situation, that of the construction loan, presents a difficult
problem. Purely from the standpoint of policy, the two competing
interests offer cases of equal strength. It is in the interest of our
economy to encourage credit sales of appliances that are to be installed
in buildings, and the Code bears witness to the enormous strength of
this policy factor. It is also in the interest of the economy to en-
courage building construction, particularly residential construction,
as witness the reams of federal legislation designed to accomplish this
result. Reverting to the example given earlier,4" who should bear the
loss, the construction lender or the credit seller of the furnace? The
Code contains no explicit answer to this question. Of the two eminent
commentators who have given this matter earnest attention, one,
Kripke would protect the credit seller of the fixture. His argument,
46 Kripke, supra note 20, at 75.
47 29 LEGAL BULL. 201, 207 (1963).
48 Kripke, supra note 20, at 69.
49 Supra p. 107, third example.
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reduced to its simplest terms, rests on two propositions, namely:
(1) the language of section 9-313(4), since it protects a recorded
mortgage as to advances made before a fixture lien is perfected by
filing, seems to suggest that the mortgage is not protected if an advance
is made thereunder after the fixture lien has been filed; and (2) more
practically, the mortgagee can protect himself by making a search of
Code fixture filings prior to each construction loan disbursement.5 °
Gilmore, although conceding that a serious problem is presented,
advances potent arguments that favor the construction mortgagee. In
the first place, he reasons, the construction lender typically brings
himself within the protection of the rule that a mortgagee must be
contractually obligated to disburse the construction funds to be fully
protected against real property liens intervening during the construc-
tion period.51 When he does this, the construction lender brings himself
within the protection of section 9-313 (4), which protects a mortgagee
who has "contracted" to make future advances. Moreover, Gilmore
argues, the pre-Code law, in recognition of the meritorious "new money"
claims of the construction lender, protected him against fixture liens
arising during the course of construction. 2
A further argument could be marshalled in favor of the Gilmore
position. In many states, contrary to the suggestion by Kripke, it is not
the practice of construction lenders to search the records as construc-
tion goes forward. In these states the law provides that if the construc-
tion mortgage is recorded before construction begins, it has priority
over mechanics' liens, and most lenders rely on this law.53 Is it now
50 Kripke, supra note 20, at 71.
512 GILMORE, supra note 43, at 831. This entire problem of "optional advances" and
"obligatory advances" is fully explored in OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 295 (1951). It is vitally
important to the construction lender to come under the umbrella of the "obligatory
advances" doctrine in order to fend off claims by mechanics' liens arising during the
course of construction. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 179, 191 (1961).
52 2 GILMORE, supra note 43, at 774, a view supported by well-reasoned decisions:
Dauch v. Ginsburg, 241 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (1931); Swift Lumber & Fuel Co. v. El-
wanger, 127 Neb. 740, 256 N.W. 875 (1934); King v. Blickfeldt, 111 Wash. 508, 191 P.
748 (1920). To these should be added Green v. Elkins, 134 Misc. 118, 235 N.Y.S. 438
(1929), which arose under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. But other pre-Code
decisions favor Kripke's viewpoint. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Cosmopolitan Club,
111 N.J. Eq. 277, 162 A. 396 (1932); Rupp v. M. S. Johnston Co., 226 Md. 181, 172
A.2d 875 (1961); McCloskey v. Henderson, 231 N.Y. 130, 131 NE. 865 (1921).
53 E.g., Clark v. General Electric Co., 243 Ark. 399, 420 S.W.2d 830 (1967). Of course,
the "obligatory advances" doctrine protects these construction lenders against judgments,
junior mortgages, etc., arising during the course of construction. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES
295 (1951). Hence no search need be made for such liens.
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their duty to search for Code filings during the course of construction
when they need not search for filed mechanics' liens? If it is, the
Code adds greatly to the cost of construction. There are areas of the
country where official searches of Code filings are simply not pro-
curable, so consequently the search must be made by an attorney. One
doubts that the Code draftsmen intended this consequence. The prac-
titioner, unable to choose between the views of these eminent com-
mentators, may well choose to advise his construction lender clients
to spend the money for Code searches during construction.
Despite some imperfections, the Code represents a giant step forward
in American law. Moreover, a distinguished group of lawyers is pres-
ently engaged in preparing a clarification of Article 9 that will un-
doubtedly provide solutions to the problems that have come to light.
Perhaps a major contribution these draftsmen could provide is an
expansion of the "comments" that illuminate the thinking behind the
text. Meanwhile, if courts and lawyers construe the Code sensibly in
the light of history, sensible solutions will be found to most of the
day-to-day problems that arise.
